I. INTRODUCTION
On May 16, 2009, Samuel Sweet, a 62-year-old husband, father, and grandfather, Marine Corps veteran of Vietnam, and Pennsylvanian, died.
2 He went to a Pittsburgh hospital reporting a severe headache that ultimately proved to be a subarachnoid hemorrhage.
3 Though typically a treatable condition, Sweet died at the hospital from what his family alleged was a combination of errors made by the doctors and nurses responsible for his care. 4 The family alleged, among other things, that Mr. Sweet was not properly intubated, which, coupled with a series of errors in judgment regarding the intubation, resulted in his death. The evidence also showed that, after causing Mr. Sweet's death, hospital staff attempted to falsify his medical records in an effort to coverup their mistakes. 5 Attempting to cover up what happened by altering Sweet's record was "a serious claim that, if proven, could result in state sanctions against the staff members beyond any award in the civil case." 6 After becoming aware of the circumstances of Samuel's death, the Sweets filed a lawsuit against the four medical providers whose negligent care allegedly caused it. 7 The suit alleged that while Sweet was in respiratory distress, a nurse improperly administered a tranquilizer that stopped his breathing. Further, Sweet's family claimed the doctors and nurses wrote notes stating Sweet refused intubation until it was too late, attempting to place the blame on the patient, rather than the caregivers. In 2012, their case resolved with a court-approved settlement. , available at http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/health/trial-to-begin-in-wrongful-death-claim-315498/ (detailing circumstances of Sweet's hospitalization and subsequent death). 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 See Sean D. Hamill, Removing Doctors in Settlements Can Deflect Oversight, Pitt. Post-Gazette, (May 20, 2012 5:03 AM), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/health/removing-doctors-insettlements-can-deflect-oversight-636684/#ixzz2DdmemBlb [hereinafter "Hamill"].
The end of the Sweet family's tragedy is the beginning of this article. After the family agreed to resolve the claim, but before they were compensated, lawyers for the hospital contacted them asking that they remove the names of the four individual defendants from the settlement agreement.
9 "UPMC [Presbyterian hospital] asked, and the Sweets didn't oppose, a request to remove all four doctors as defendants in the case." Instead, the hospital's lawyers wanted only the hospital to be listed as the party responsible for making the settlement. 10 UPMC's spokesman, Paul Wood, claimed that the four providers were dismissed because the actions in the case were not due to any one physician, but in effect, this meant that the only defendant officially held responsible was the hospital. Had the hospital admitted that the removal of the individual was done as a condition of settlement, then the report would have been reportable.
The reason: by strategically manipulating the parties on whose behalf the settlement was made, the individuals involved with Mr. Sweet's death could exploit a technicality and avoid being reported to the federal entity designated to track all malpractice payments -the National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"). 11 While this article focuses on the reporting of medical malpractice payments, the NPDB must also be informed of other actions. For example, state licensing boards must report disciplinary actions; hospitals and other health care facilities must report suspension, restriction or surrender of clinical privileges as a result of investigation; professional societies must report review actions related to professional competence that adversely affected membership; and the Department of Health and Human Services must report exclusions 9 Id. 10 See id. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. SERVS. ADMIN., Pub. No. HRSA-95-225; NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK GUIDEBOOK E-12 (2001), available at http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/NPDBGuidebook.pdf [hereinafter NPDB GUIDEBOOK] . 11 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743 Sec. 425 (1986) (HCQIA) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 11101-11152 (2011) ). NPDB Guidebook, supra note 9, at E-13. Although not the focus of this article, peer review reporting is an area in drastic need of reform. According to Public Citizen, peer review reporting is one of the most important and most misunderstood Medical Practice Act requirements. Alan Levine and Sidney Wolfe, MD, Hospitals Drop the Ball on Physician Oversight, May 27, 2009, pp.2, 5, 16-18, 21, available at: http://www.citizen.org/documents/18731.pdf. The scope of the apparent intentional gaming to avoid peer review sanction-reporting is staggering: after 17 years of existence, almost half of all hospitals in the United States have never reported a single privilege sanction. Id. Prior to the opening of the NPDB, the federal government estimated that 5,000 reports would be submitted every year. The health care industry estimated 10,000. Id. The actual number proved to be 650; or one-sixteenth of the industry's own prediction. Id. from Medicaid/Medicare and other federal programs. The effect of the scheme was the prevention of the doctors' and nurses' future employers from ever knowing of, or investigating, their role in Samuel Sweet's death.
The specific ploy used by the defendants is called "corporate shielding," and it is estimated to be used in up to 50% of all malpractice settlements. 12 It is not the only trick used to bypass NPDB reporting, and those interested in using these self-serving methods need not search far to get instruction. 13 The venerable American Medical Association's (AMA) own website, for example, once gave advice to readers on "how to evade a report to the NPDB." 14 The Sweets' may have perceived that they had a Hobson's choice to agree with this manipulation of the NPDB as a condition for settlement. 15 The Sweets' attorney suggested that if the family refused to agree to remove a doctor's name from a settlement, he could make resolution more difficult for the family: "I've had a number of cases where I know the doctor is responsible for a death or injury and the hospital wants to dismiss him or her," Mr. Perry said. But, he said, since plaintiffs such as Mr. Sweet's wife, Janet, often need the settlement money to pay for the lost income of a loved one or ongoing medical care, "how much do I want to fight?" Simply put, many insurers and doctors refuse to settle a claim if it means having the negligent doctor reported. A 2003 study showed that within six years of the NPDB's inception, the probability that an injured patient's claim would receive payment fell to 12 See Hamill, supra note 7 (highlighting corporate shield issue as "a known problem for a long time"); see also Lawrence E. Smarr, A Comparative Assessment of the PIAA Data Sharing Project and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application, 60 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 67 (1997) (estimating number of malpractice-payment reports affected by corporate shielding). 13 See Section III, infra, discussing various methods of NPDB evasion. 14 Archive of Resources, National Practitioner Data Bank, American Medical Association (Feb. 13, 2009 ), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20090213135616/http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/legal-topics/business-management-topics/national-practitioner-data-bank.shtml (as of Feb. 13, 2009). After some period of time, the AMA altered their wording to remove the word "evasion." See http://web.archive.org/web/20100806093134/http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legaltopics/business-management-topics/national-practitioner-data-bank.shtml (as of Aug. 10, 2010). 15 See Hamill, supra, note 7.
[VOL. 5:1 87 59% of pre-NPDB levels. 16 In a separate study, a national insurance organization revealed that 97% of insurers were less willing to settle claims after becoming required to report their insured doctors to the NPDB. 17 Thus, while the NPDB seeks to protect potential malpractice victims from inept doctors, 18 part of the cost has been paid by actual malpractice victims. These victims are now more likely to go without compensation because payments would create a paper trail of past performance that some doctors are unwilling to allow to exist. Yet, when a doctor does successfully avoid reporting claims to the NPDB, the cost is borne by not only future employers (who must make a hiring decision without crucial information), but the patients who will ultimately be treated by the evasive practitioner.
This article argues that it is time to improve the NPDB reporting in a way that protects injured patients by incentivizing settlement, and also takes meaningful steps to improve the NPDB's data collection. To do so, it traces the genesis of the NPDB, summarizes the NPDB's difficulties in maintaining compliance, and explains how opponents of the NPDB have pushed it toward failure. Ultimately, this article concludes with a series of proposed reforms to improve the NPDB's efforts to collect accurate data as well as increase the likelihood of fair compensation for malpractice claims.
II. THE NPDB'S CONTROVERSIAL GENESIS
Before the NPDB was created, each state was responsible for monitoring its own doctors and there were no formal channels for them to communicate with one another.
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Before the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, this information was only available pertaining to the physician's actions within a certain state. Physician recruiters 16 Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of the National Practitioner Data Bank on Resolution of Malpractice Claims, 40 INQUIRY 283, 290 (2003) . 17 James S. Todd, Just Numbers or Knowledge?, Pub. Health Rep., July-Aug. 1995, at 378. 18 For the sake of brevity, this article refers to the medical professionals subject to NPDB reporting as "doctors" or "physicians." However, other medical professionals are also subject to NPDB reporting, including dentists and any individual licensed or authorized by a State to provide health care services. See Department of Health and Human Services. (expanding the definition of health care entities required to report). 19 Heidi Dawson, RN, CMSR, The National Practitioner Databank and its Use to You as a Physician Recruiter, available at http://www.thephysicianrecruiters.com/the-national-practitioner-databank-and-itsuse-to-you-as-a-physician-recruiter. and hiring entities were unable to find out if the physician being recruited had any problems in other parts of the country unless disclosed fully by the applicant. This proved problematic.
By way of example, a 1994 Boston Globe investigative report revealed just how easily incompetent doctors could skip from state to state and continue practicing medicine. 20 One physician featured in the piece was alleged to have negligently injured five patients in Massachusetts before disappearing from the state, leaving behind a string of pending malpractice cases. 21 He left his victims without any chance to recover by choosing not to carry malpractice insurance, and shielded his assets by hiding them in his wife's name. 22 The trail of claims against him in Massachusetts did not prevent him, though, from getting a new job in Georgia. 23 Despite the allegations in Massachusetts, he arrived in Georgia with "glowing" references. 24 Things eventually soured when the doctor reported to the emergency room while drunk. 25 The doctor then left Georgia for Pennsylvania, where he got yet another new job as a doctor and began, once again, to treat patients.
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By opening a central repository, Congress hoped the NPDB would prevent this sort of skipping around to avoid state regulators. 27 The data bank was created as part of the 1986 Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA). 28 It included a bargain: in exchange for requiring the reporting of all malpractice payments and discipline against 20 physicians, it granted partial immunity to health care entities that conduct peer reviews.
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The coupling of immunity with required reporting was intended to protect hospitals from charges of malfeasance for reporting information about doctors with imperfect records, while discouraging potential employers from unknowingly hiring incompetent doctors.
30
The NPDB would not make hiring decisions, per se, but if it worked correctly, it would assure that employers had applicants' complete history of paid claims and discipline.
Although it never purported to do anything but collect information, NPDB was turned into a boogey man by the critics from the outset. They claimed its mere existence would do everything from ruin doctors' careers to destroy their psyches. 31 Insiders admitted many doctors would put self-interest first if forcing litigation was the only way for them to avoid being reported to the NPDB. 32 faced with the certainty that they can no longer hide their past records, physicians facing disciplinary action will feel compelled to challenge vigorously any action taken against them.
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To discourage non-compliance, the NPDB rules imposed a $10,000 fine for any failure to report a malpractice payment. 35 History reveals that the NPDB has been unable or unwilling to enforce the rules: in response to a Freedom of Information Act request made during the drafting of this article, HHS has never, in the entire history of the NPDB, levied a single fine against any person or entity for failure to report a malpractice claim. 36 to settle lawsuits … So the verdict's still out on whether the data does more harm than good. HHS has always been on the defensive with respect to the NPDB. During the congressional hearings on its creation, critics proposed most any alternative they could imagine to kill the creation of a central data bank. As alternatives, they proposed strengthening state licensing boards, 37 improving state peer review and risk management programs, 38 and making certain insurance company information available to disciplinary agencies. 39 Congress did not accept the premise that patients could be protected without the NPDB. As one congressman explained, state licensing boards, hospitals and medical societies had already proven incapable of self-policing involving malpractice. 40 As one congressman pointed out, "even the most diligent hospital [could not] obtain adequate background about physicians applying for privileges at its facility." The idea that states or medical societies and insurers would magically begin exchanging this sort of information without the NPDB seemed unlikely. Once apparent that the NPDB would be created, opponents changed tactics and sought to weaken it. They urged that the data bank add a "threshold," which would prevent it from collecting data on small malpractice payments. 42 The most commonly stated argument in favor of thresholds was that small payments are often made to avoid the cost of defending a case as opposed to evidence of an act of malpractice. 43 It would also, of course, keep fewer doctors from being reported.
Threshold proponents did not suggest how they would deal with the reporting of low-value payments that did result from clear malpractice. For example, an HHS official explained that if a $50,000 threshold was to be instituted, it would eliminate virtually all dental claims. 44 Simply stated, because damages tend to be small in some claimsregardless of level of culpability -the threshold would prevent future employers from being aware of those claims.
Congress ultimately chose not to incorporate a threshold, recognizing that a significant number of small settlements result from authentic negligence with modest damages suffered by the patient. 45 As a consolation to critics, HHS wrote into the NPDB's regulations that "a payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has 42 "Some organizations noted that malpractice reporting thresholds vary by geographic area." See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-92-56, Practitioner Data Bank: Information on Small Medical Malpractice Payments (1992), at 10, available at biotech.law.lsu.edu/policy/147248.pdf. 43 See Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 26, at 373 (statement of Jerome Bettman, Chairman, Ethics Committee of the American Academy of Ophthalmologists) ("We are trying to eliminate all the small claims simply because they represent just simply settlement, the nuisance value of defending a case, trying to get some common ground where you could eliminate the majority of those type of settlements."); id. at 313 (statement of Jack W. Owen, Executive Vice President, American Hospital Association) (proffering claims up until $10,000 "nuisance kind of claims"); id. at 313 (statement of Mr. Horty, President, National Council of Community Hospitals) (suggesting claims under $25,000 be excluded). 44 Diane M. Gianelli, "Should it go to the Bank? Officials weigh open claims and reporting thresholds," Amer. Med. News, Sep. 21, 1992 (quoting the director of the HHS agency that manages NPDB). 45 See Hearings on H.R. 5110, supra note 26, at 14 ("...a significant number of small payments may, notwithstanding the sums involved, represent truly meritorious claims."). "Implementing reporting thresholds based on an assumption that 'small' payments represent settlements for convenience may have unexpected and unfortunate results." See Josef E. Fischer, National Practitioner Data Bank: The NPDB and Surgical Residents (Letters to the Editor), 82 BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS 1 (Jan. 1997), available at http://facs.org/ahp/proliab/0197art.html.
occurred."
46 This caveat, though, has proven virtually meaningless; even high ranking HHS officials associate a report in the data bank with stigma for any doctor named in it. 47 III.
THE BASICS OF THE NPDB'S OPERATION For all of the concern it has raised, the NPDB's authority is very narrow. It does only two things: it collects information about medical providers, and it disseminates that information to a limited community authorized to view it. It does not sanction any doctor, nor does it draw any conclusions about the significance of the data it collects. This section summarizes the nitty-gritty of the NPDB's functions.
A. QUERYING THE NPDB Information from the NPDB about individual doctors is visible only to a closeduniverse of users and is completely hidden from and inaccessible to the public. . It was not without debate, however: the original draft of the bill introducing the HCQIA did not contain such a provision, but rather was added subsequently to deal with physician's concerns that payments would be construed as always being synonymous with malpractice. Ryzen, supra note 27, at 429 (1992). 47 In arguing for including thresholds in the NPDB, the general counsel of HHS noted that "[i]f a doctor is going to be stigmatized by an award that low, then he's going to want to fight it." Diane M. Gianelli, "Should it go to the Bank? Officials weigh open claims and reporting thresholds," Amer. Med. News, Sep. 21, 1992 (quoting HHS'a General Counsel). 48 The NPDB's secrecy from consumers and the public is a significant problem. Analysis of the transparency issue is beyond the scope of this article, though the consumer rights organization, Public Citizen, has done yeoman's work to explain why it is vital to fairness and public safety to make the data bank publicly accessible. Individuals allowed to view reports are subject to a $10,000 fine if they fail to keep the information confidential.
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Only hospitals -and no other person or entity -must query the data bank.
50 They are to do so when they are (1) considering hiring or granting clinical privileges to a health care practitioner and (2) as a follow-up for those practitioners every two years after they have been hired. 51 Other health care entities (including HMOs and group medical practices, as well as professional medical societies and state licensing boards) are authorized to query the data bank, but not required to do so. 52 Individual providers are also, of course, entitled to self-query. 53 Other than the entities listed above, the only other group that can ever query a provider's name is plaintiffs' attorneys. 54 However, they are rarely allowed the opportunity and do so under tightly-controlled circumstances. 50 See 45 C.F.R. §60.12 (2010) (listing information that hospitals must request from NPDB); see also, supra note 9, at D-4. 51 NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at D-2 52 See NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at D-3 (listing health care entities that may, but are not required to, query the NPDB). 53 See id. (stating physicians, dentists, and other health care practitioners may query their own files). 54 See NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at D-4 ("Plaintiff's attorney or plaintiff representing himself or herself who has filed a medical malpractice action or claim in a State or Federal court or other adjudicative body against a hospital [may query] when evidence is submitted to HHS which reveals that the hospital failed to make a required query of the NPDB on the practitioner(s) also named in the action or claim"). 55 See 45 C.F.R. §60.13 (a)(1)(ii); NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at D-4. Defense attorneys are not, however, permitted access to the NPDB because the defendant doctor is permitted to self-query. NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at D-6. A plaintiff, through his or her attorney, can obtain NPDB information in a case in which both an individual provider and a hospital are defendants. NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at D-5. If the plaintiff has evidence that the hospital failed to query the NPDB regarding the provider involved in the allegedly substandard care, the plaintiff may request a query of the NPDB to see that provider's record. NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at D-6. The absence of a hospital query to the NPDB would, presumably, evidence the hospital's failure to perform due diligence. NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at D-6 ("[I]nformation…can only be used with respect to a legal action or claim against the hospital, not against the subject."). Any misuse of the information by the attorney is subject to a fine. Id. B. REPORTING TO THE NPDB Any time an insurer, hospital, or other entity makes a payment on behalf of a doctor as a result of a written claim, or in satisfaction of judgment, that paying entity must report it to the NPDB. 56 There is no minimum threshold that triggers reportingeven a settlement of one cent, if paid as a result of a written claim, must be reported. Each entity (including an insurance company) which makes payment under a policy of insurance, selfinsurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice action or claim shall report, in accordance with section 11134 of this title, information respecting the payment and circumstances thereof. Though the triggering event for NPDB reporting is when a report is made on behalf of a doctor, some doctors have direct authority to determine if their insurer settles a claim on their behalf, regardless of fault. Those whose insurance contracts include "consent to settle" clauses can prevent case resolution even when a settlement is within an insured's policy limit and the insurer wishes to settle (thus, preventing them from suffering any personal financial loss). ("…disclosing settlements is particularly contentious because many malpractice insurance policies allow the insurer to settle without the physician's permission. On the other hand, excluding settlements … allows physicians to evade reporting by settling suits confidentially."). Typically, unless a physician has a specific consent-to-settle clause, the insurer may settle a claim as it deems expedient and in its self-interest, so long as it acted in good faith. Id. Insurers are not required to take reputational harm into consideration when considering a settlement; it is a purely business-based decision. Id. In light of public policy concerns, some states have prohibited the use of consent-to-settle clauses, seeking to reduce the number of cases reaching trial and rationalizing that it is best to settle medical malpractice claims outside the courthouse. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.4147; MD. CODE INS. § 19-104 (2013). Florida, for example, codified the prohibition against such clauses in the interest of protecting an insurers' ability to limit liability through settlements that are within policy limits. Freeman v. Cohen, 969 So.2d 1150, 1156 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (Klein, J. concurring). If physicians are able to bring claims against insurers for settling a claim that is within their policy based on reputational arguments, insurers would find that potential liability on a given claim may be far in excess of policy limits, due to the risk of suit against them by their insured for settling a claim without consent. Id.;Florida's statute forbids these clauses, stating "[i]t is against public policy for any insurance or self-insurance policy to contain a clause giving the insured the exclusive right to veto any offer for admission of liability and for arbitration made pursuant to s. 766.106, settlement offer, or offer of judgment, when such offer is within the policy limits. See FLA. STAT. The report must be made whether or not the doctor on whose behalf a payment is made, or the actual payer, believes the act was one of malpractice (as opposed to, for example, being paid out of convenience). 58 The report must include a detailed narrative explaining a description of patient, the patient's medical condition, the acts or omissions that triggered the complaint, the allegations, and legal outcome. 59 Though it has never been enforced, a penalty of up to $11,000 can be assessed for a failure to report. 60 Once in the system, NPDB reports are not permanent unless there has been a determination that the report should not have been filed. 61 If there is an error, a doctor can legislation contact the reporting entity to request a correction; if the entity declines, the physician can petition the NPDB to append a personal statement clarifying the report.
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IV. THE MISUSES AND ABUSES OF THE NPDB Although the law creating the NPDB was passed in 1986, the Data Bank did not actually begin collecting reports until 1990 and implementation of its computer system was completed. 63 When it finally started operating, many of the predictions of gaming proved true. A 1992 report found that many doctors had already adopted a "scorched earth" approach to the NPDB, refusing to settle any claims and insisting on all cases going to trial.
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By then, it was apparent that loopholes in the regulations had been identified and exploited to avoid reporting. 65 Defense attorneys were reportedly insisting on verbal demands, instead of written ones, to escape reporting because only written demands resulting in a payment required a report.
66 By 1992, medical facilities were already using corporate shielding tactics by dropping doctors before any settlement was paid so it that the report has been voided and removed from the NPDB. Id. They are instructed to remove any copies of the now-voided report from their files. Id. 62 See 45 C.F.R. § 60.16 (setting forth NPDB dispute process); see also NPDB Guidebook, supra note 9, at F-1 (describing NPDB report dispute process). The subject of a report may not submit changes to the report; instead, he or she must request that the reporting entity file a correction. See NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at F-1. If the entity declines to change it, the subject can then initiate a dispute with the Secretary, add a statement to the report, or both. See NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at F-1. Subjects cannot use the dispute process to protest a payment or appeal the underlying reasons of an adverse action. See NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at F-1. ("Neither the merits of a medical malpractice claim nor the appropriateness of, of basis for, an adverse action may be disputed."). 63 Ryzen, supra note 27, at 421 The long delay was caused primarily by disputes over the proposed rules to govern it. Ryzen, supra note 27, at 421. Things did not get any easier after the delayed opening: On the eve of its operations commencing, the non-partisan General Accounting Office (GAO) released a blistering report, entitled the "National Health Practitioner Data Bank Has Not Been Well Managed." See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-90-68, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK HAS NOT BEEN WELL MANAGED (1990) (outlining poor development and management of NPDB). The report chronicled the NPDB's leadership failures, with accusations ranging from contract mismanagement to maintaining insufficient security. Id. 64 Ryzen, supra note 27, at 435. 65 Ryzen, supra note 27, at 436-438. 66 Ryzen, supra note 27, at 436. appeared that only their hospital-employer was liable. 67 As one attorney put it, "it's not hard to find settled suits around the nation that have been structured to bypass the reporting requirements." 68 The situation did not improve in the following years.
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With unrelenting gaming of the system, HHS decided by 1998 to reform the reporting requirements to eliminate the corporate shield loophole. 70 They proposed requiring reporting of payments made on behalf of practitioners who provided the care that was the subject of the claim or action, regardless of whether the individual was "named" as a defendant in a settlement. 71 HHS' management of the data bank has allowed weaknesses that undermine achievement of a timely, secure, and cost-efficient operation. The data bank usually does not provide users with responses to their queries for several weeks, which in turn delays the granting of privileges to health care practitioners. Further, due to insufficient internal controls, user organizations have, on occasion, received sensitive practitioner data to which they were not entitled. In addition, HHS has inadequately monitored the data bank contractor, which has allowed known automated system problems to persist. Finally, while HHS plans to redesign the data bank, its plans have not incorporated a sound system development approach and are based on funding uncertainties. As a result, HHS may acquire a system that does not address users' needs. Id. at 2-3. 70 63 Fed. Reg. 71255 (Dec. 24, 1998): The proposed regulations would amend the existing reporting requirements regarding payments on medical malpractice claims or actions in order to include reports on payments made on behalf of those practitioners who provided the medical care that is the subject of the claim or action, whether or not they were named as defendants in the claim or action. 71 shielding, which the agency described as a situation in which parties agreed "to dismiss a defendant health care practitioner from a proceeding, leaving or substituting a hospital or other corporate entity as defendant."
72 As part of this proposal, HHS conceded that their loosely drafted rules were part of the problem and the motivation within the medical industry was "at least in part for the purpose of allowing the practitioner to avoid having a report on a malpractice payment made on his or her behalf submitted to the Data Bank." 73 HHS recognized the necessity of this change, explaining that corporate shielding subverts Congress's intent because it "…makes it possible for practitioners whose negligent or substandard care has resulted in compensable injury to patients to evade having that fact appear in the Data Bank…." 74 24, 1998) . Although a few years after the NPDB began operations in 1990, updated advice was added to the guidebook stating "if the practitioner is dismissed from the lawsuit in consideration of the payment being made in settlement of the lawsuit, the payment can only be construed as a payment for the benefit of the health care practitioner and must be reported to the NPDB." Plaintiffs' lawyers say that regulation is toothless because hospitals simply will not admit the doctors were removed as a condition of the settlement. See Sean D. Hamill, Removing Doctors in Settlements Can Deflect Oversight, Pitt. Post-Gazette, at A1 (May 20, 2012). 73 See Hamill, supra note 71 (noting recent $1.37 million case settled in a way that unfairly protects doctors named in case). Removing doctors' names from cases to prevent them from being reported to the NPDB "has been a known problem for a long time. 74 Id. at 71256; see also Linda Prager, Data Bank Seeks More Reports, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, March, 22/29, 1999, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/1999/pick_99/pick0322.htm ("This likely will renew long-simmering distrust of the data bank and calls to dismantle it."). Many saw the proposed change as a threat to due process, in effect turning the insurance companies into the judge and jury. See id. Lawrence Smarr, President of the Physician Insurers Association of America, noted that "[t]he data bank that requiring reporting of all paid claims would eliminate the unsavory practice of corporate shielding and improve data integrity. 75 To avoid unfair results, HHS identified in the proposal an escape vale for the rare situations in which system error, rather than a practitioner, was responsible for injury to a patient. As part of the proposal, to avoid unfair results, HHS even identified an escape valve for the rare situations in which a system error resulted in an injury to a patient, as opposed to an injury caused directly by a practitioner. 76 In the event of an authentic system failure, the reporter of the payment would simply explain the sequence of events and explain why no negligent individual could be identified.
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With a proposed rule ready for implementation after a normally-perfunctory comment period, the mess that followed is difficult to fathom. After receiving comments to the proposed rule, HHS decided against immediately finalizing it. 78 As a reason, they explained that "[m]ore than 120 comments on the proposed rule were received…" and " [g] iven the large number of thoughtful comments and the high level of concern that was voiced about the potential impact of the proposal as published, HRSA believes it is has a valid concern that entities are avoiding reporting on practitioners. But they've reached the wrong conclusion on how to deal with it." Id. Additionally, Executive Vice President of the AMA, E. Ratcliffe Anderson Jr., rejected the idea that the loophole even existed, claiming the government had no right to second-guess who a plaintiff decides to sue. Id [HHS] does recognize that there are legitimate situations when it is impossible to identify a practitioner(s) for whose benefit the payment was made. For example, a situation could occur wherein a power failure causes a heart monitor to cease functioning leading to an injury or death, which ultimately leads to a malpractice payment. In these very limited circumstances, the Secretary proposes to require that the reporter state the sequence of events that led to the payment, why the practitioner could not be identified, and the amount of the payment. The Department will use this information to identify medical malpractice reporters that appear to make a practice of not identifying specific practitioners. 77 Id. 78 Id. imperative to gather additional data and conduct further analyses before proceeding." 79 Yet there is no evidence that further data was gathered, nor any suggestion that there was further analysis of the issue.
The withdrawal of the rule marked the beginning of a confusing tangle of regulatory process, delay, and, ultimately, failure. On April 17, 2000, HHS announced that a new proposal -a "second notice of proposed rulemaking" -would be issued on The GAO concluded that HHS had long been aware of widespread underreporting of medical malpractice payments, but "the agency has not included steps for addressing underreporting in its strategic plan, nor has it taken a systematic approach to the problem." 92 The report also chronicled the ill-fated (and at that time, ongoing) attempt to create a new regulation to close the corporate shield loophole. 93 The GAO attributed the failure to bring about this change to "the health care industry," which "overwhelmingly opposed the proposal…."
94 This report did not provide insights into why the health care industry was able to defeat this rule, nor did it explain why HHS would choose not to pursue needed regulatory reform when the affected industry objected.
NPDB opponents jumped on the GAO report to argue that, instead of being reformed, the data bank should be shuttered. 95 NPDB was "a little like the Corleone family complaining about inept police work." 98 The editorial posited that the real reason for the criticism emanating from the AMA was that:
[m]any AMA members simply hate the idea that malpractice suits and disciplinary actions against them are recorded somewhere, especially in a national repository. They would much rather toss a stick of dynamite at the databank than take out a wrench and fix it. These doctors have an accomplice in the hospitals that alter the way they discipline their staffs to avoid having to report negative information.
99
The widespread acceptance of the AMA's oppose-at-any-cost attitude toward the NPDB was, in part, confirmed by data that revealed dramatic rates of errors and noncompliance with reporting procedures. 100 In addition to widespread underreporting, a study auditing NPDB malpractice reports found that nearly all reports that actually were submitted were incomplete. 101 Of a 250-report sample, only one met the NPDB's requirements for disclosing the circumstances associated with payments. 102 More than 19 of every 20 reports ignored the required evaluation of whether the doctor being reported met the standard of care.
103
More than ninety-five percent of the reports in the sample failed to mention whether the standard of care had been considered when the claim was settled or adjudicated, and of the reports that did, only one such noted the actual determination. HHS actually acknowledged that the reports were often incomplete, explaining they are not manually screened before accepted into the data bank. Additionally, 71 of the 250 reports included patient and practitioner names, information that is not supposed to be included in the report. . 102 Id at 20. 103 95.6% of the reports failed to include this information. Id. at 20 ("only 1 met NPDB requirements for disclosing the circumstances associated with payments"). Id. at 20-22 104 Id. Embarrassingly, in addition to private practitioners evading the NPDB reporting requirements, it has become apparent that HHS has failed to maintain NPDB compliance even among doctors employed by HHS itself. HHS oversees hundreds of healthcare providers, including doctors employed by the Indian Health Service and National Institutes of Health.
105 While HHS agencies are not technically subject to report to the NPDB, they have done so since the outset as a result of a policy directive requiring it.
106
A 2005 report investigating these HHS doctors found that over a 15-year period, barely one-third of the NPDB reports that should have been filed actually were.
107
V.
INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO THE NPDB'S PROBLEMS Over the course of its existence, the NPDB has proven ineffective at collecting the information that it is empowered to gather. Worse than that, these failures have made it harder for patients to receive compensation for injuries. It is not simply bureaucratic bumbling behind the NPDB's problems, though. The next section explains how the medical industry has encouraged this result.
Opponents use impassioned rhetoric to delegitimize the NPDB, calling it a "blacklist," an "Orwellian nightmare," "Medical McCarthyism," "Big Brother," "Frankenstein," "scarlet letter," and akin to "Nazi Germany." 108 An industry representative used scare tactics when he published a piece thundering that the NPDB was enacted to ruin medical careers, not protect the public. 109 In 2008, Medical Economics ran an article called "Who's Afraid of the NPDB?" with a subheading stating: "If you're not, perhaps you should be. A National Practitioner Data Bank listing can wreak havoc on your career." helps to explain why a program enacted to protect patients has proven to be a stumbling block to fair compensation.
Opposition to the NPDB is not just empty rhetoric. Instead, NPDB opponents have mobilized and taught one another loopholes and tricks to beat the system, 111 This section develops a paradigm of the creative, evasive ways identified to bypass reporting requirements and effectively subvert the NPDB's statutory purpose.
A. CORPORATE SHIELDING As referenced above, the reporting rules apply to payments made on behalf of an individual for malpractice. 112 However, a payment made solely as a result of a claim against an entity (such as a hospital or group practice) is not reportable. 113 In fact, for a particular provider to be reported for a malpractice claim, the practitioner "must be named in both the written complaint or claim demanding monetary payment for damages and the settlement release or final adjudication, if any." 114 A provider identified in a release, but not in the initial written demand (or as a defendant in a lawsuit), is not to be reported. 115 A practitioner named in the initial claim, but subsequently dismissed and not named in the settlement release, is, likewise, not subject to the reporting requirements. NPDB officials have acknowledged that this 'corporate shield' effect may have affected the number of malpractice-payment reports.
116
This bypass strategy is common where physicians work for an entity that is willing to be held liable for them, such as university hospitals or HMOs. Arguably, the plaintiff is still afforded a fair settlement amount-but the tactic hides a possiblyincompetent physician's record and subverts the purpose of the NPDB in collecting data on doctors for whom claims are paid.
For some medical facilities, using the corporate shield is a publicized strategy to minimize reporting. The University of Michigan Health System (UMHS), for example, "avowedly uses the corporate shield, and its settlements are generally in the institution's 111 Haavi Morreim, Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of Dodging the Data Bank, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109 (2012) (outlining various strategic ways to avoid NPDB reporting). 112 NPDB Guidebook, supra note 9, at E-8 and E-30, Question 9. 113 NPDB Guidebook, supra note 9, at E-8. 114 NPDB Guidebook, supra note 9, at E-11. 115 See Wayne J. Guglielmo, Are Doctors Evading The Malpractice Data Bank?, Med. Econ., at 96 (May 28, 1996). 116 Id. name."
117 UMHS physicians are employees rather than independent contractors and "reporting of individual caregivers in medical malpractice claims in the National Practitioner Data Bank is rare."
118 UMHS takes advantage of being a self-insured employer and will pay the claim in the entity's name, even when a doctor is solely responsible. Incompetent physicians are shielded from reporting by virtue of being employed by a willing corporate shill. By so doing, they prevent the NPDB from ever becoming aware of a payment paid as a result of a claim against an individual.
Preventing A Written Claim From Arising
To be considered a reportable claim under the NPDB, a claim must be written.
119
Verbal requests for compensation for malpractice are, thus, not covered. Though this loophole seems inconsistent with the NPDB's goal of identifying doctors making payments for malpractice, it is well-known and broadly exploited. 120 As the NPDB requirements deal explicitly with written complaints filed with an adjudicative body, doctors have been able to circumvent NPDB regulations by negotiating with a plaintiff's attorney and settling on the basis of an oral complaint. 121 The NPDB even seems to tacitly recommend this technique, stating in its guidebook that "[o]nly payments resulting from written demands are reportable to the NPDB. Even if the practitioner transmits the demand in writing to the medical malpractice payer, the payment is not reportable if the patient's only demand was oral." 122 Some businesses in the insurance industry have constructed entire sets of procedures for exploiting the verbal claims loophole. For example, in Colorado, COPIC Insurance is the state's largest malpractice insurer and operates an early disclosure and compensation program that allows physicians to escape NPDB reporting because payment is offered voluntarily before a lawyer is engaged or a claim is filed. 123 If a patient asks that a lawyer write to COPIC to make a demand, they are immediately eliminated from participating in the program. 124 
Provider Pays Out-of-Pocket
As originally written, the NPDB's authorizing statute required each "entity" making a medical malpractice payment to report it. 125 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has read the requirement narrowly to require the reporting of only payments made on behalf of a physician. 126 As a result, a payment made by a doctor him or herself is not considered a payment requiring NPDB reporting. This is true even if that payment is made for a clear act of negligence harming a patient. While not binding precedent outside of the D.C. Circuit, anti-NPDB advocates have broadcasted the advice that doctors who have paid for insurance policies can pay claims out-of-pocket to avoid NPDB reporting. 
Refunding Money
To be reportable, a money payment must be made and a doctor can avoid the requirement to report a payment by waiving the patient's debt or refunding payment. seemingly ignore the subtle implication that a patient's acceptance of a refund or debt forgiveness somehow makes it less likely that a provider committed an act of negligence. 
Pre-Suit Mediation
In theory, a doctor can use a mediation agreement to avoid reporting a payment should the patient be subsequently compensated for malpractice.
131 Some facilities have patients sign a mediation agreement before treatment that says that if there is an allegation of malpractice, the parties will mediate.
132 Separately, some states require mediation prior to the filing of malpractice claims in court.
133
For patients subject to pre-suit mediation, it has been argued that the claim that begins the process is not a "written demand" asking for money for the alleged malpractice, "but simply [a request] for a voluntary conversation whose usual purpose is to avoid litigation."
134 As a result, "the plain language of the statute or contract suggests that an NPDB report is not required. That is, a written demand to discuss does not constitute a written demand for payment. If a settlement ensues, the argument goes that plain language further would imply that the money was not paid in response to a written claim or demand for payment." 
End-Running the NPDB with State Legislation
At least one state, Oregon, has crafted special legislation to avoid practitioners who believe they are liable for malpractice to offer to enter into negotiations for a payment. 136 Any resulting payment, by definition in the law, is explicitly not made in response to a written demand. 137 The legislative history shows that this was plainly 130 Id. worded to avoid NPDB reporting. 138 The effect is that practitioners can repeatedly negotiate payments stemming from malpractice without ever having to report to the NPDB. 139 The law goes one step further and prevents licensing boards and hospital peer reviewers from using information about these payments to take disciplinary action. 140 Ultimately, the Oregon law facilitates malpractice payments, but does nothing to inform future employers about -or protect the public from-further malpractice by the practitioner.
While those who decry the NPDB will celebrate the identification of these evasion techniques, the overarching issue is how HHS, the agency charged with maintaining the integrity of the data bank and protecting the public, polices such brazen reporting. At times, the HHS has been explicit in their recognition that the NPDB is routinely circumvented and yet, the agency has not reformed NPDB to capture accurate information about malpractice payments. Instead, their response has been to equivocate repeatedly, with the only clear reason being the objections of those the NPDB exists to regulate.
VI. REFORMING THE NPDB
In addition to having problems with data integrity and serving as a barrier to claims settlement, the NPDB has few supporters. It has become one of those rare legal creations that is unpopular both with the medical-insurance community and the plaintiffs' bar.
141 Its long-term problems and widespread unpopularity forces one to ask a bigger 138 See Oshel e-mail, supra note 47. There is evidence that the NPDB is meeting its purpose of helping medical employers make better hiring decisions. For example, a 2003 study found that 21% of applicants' NPDB reports included information that was previously unknown to the querying institution.
142 This was true "[e]ven when practitioners knew the information they provided would be verified."
143 Indeed, the 2003 study's authors found that although some incompleteness could be attributed to innocent causes, a significant portion of doctors applying for jobs may have been "willfully withholding negative information."
144
Put differently, some doctors with a bad history are applying for jobs and misrepresenting their discipline history. The NPDB has helped to make potential employers aware of this information gap in more than one of every five cases. It follows that more complete information has allowed medical employers to make better hiring decisions.
With the size of the medical industry in the United States, the number of medical hiring decisions that the NPDB has protected has been enormous: estimates are that NPDB querying alters 5% of hiring decisions. 145 Given the size of medical field, this
Pivotal Law Group's recommended course was for plaintiffs to participate in the defendants' evasion of the NPDB: Given the disincentives to settlement created by the NPDB reporting requirements, in the authors' experience it is advisable, where appropriate and supported by the facts and law, to include as defendants hospitals, clinics and other organizations that may have culpability in a medical negligence action -as these parties do not face the same reporting requirements imposed on physicians by the NPDB. means that 160,000 hiring or retention decisions for medical professionals in the United States are affected annually as a result of NPDB querying. 146 It would be absurd to say the NPDB is not useful in at least some respects with this figure in mind.
Its utility has been directly acknowledged by those making hiring decisions. While some doctors and medical associations howl against the NPDB, hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs) tend to support it: "[Eighty-three] percent of hospital officials and [ninety-six] percent of MCO officials we surveyed regarded the Data Bank reports they received on practitioners to be useful to them…."
147 Two-thirds of all queries are submitted by voluntary queriers, especially MCOs. 148 It should speak to the perceived usefulness of NPDB reports that voluntary queriers spend millions a year to obtain these reports. 149 Ultimately, then, the NPDB appears to have some level of effectiveness in helping hospitals make hiring decisions. This important benefit makes protection and improvement of the NPDB worthwhile. However, important changes are needed to improve the ability of those injured by malpractice, for whom the NPDB's very existence has become a barrier to recovery.
B. HOW TO REFORM THE NPDB To resolve the problem, there are two types of changes that could potentially impact settlement behavior: changing the way those subject to the NPDB behave, and changing the way the NPDB conducts itself. These changes should be made with an eye toward incentivizing behaviors that treat injured patients fairly while not unduly harming medical professionals, their potential employers, or others with an interest in the NPDB. This section proposes a series of possibilities to do so.
Eliminating Corporate Shielding by Switching to an "All Paid
Claims" or "All Claims" Reporting System If the NPDB is to exist, then improving data integrity must be an important priority. If done properly, improving data integrity might ultimately also improve patients' abilities to receive compensation.
The HHS has already proposed one loophole closure: the elimination of the corporate shield.
150 By requiring the naming of doctors on whose behalf payments are made, the corporate shield will effectively be destroyed. 151 For reasons that are unexplained and, perhaps, inexplicable, HHS never finalized the rule that would have done just this.
152 At first glance, closing this loophole seems like a good solution. The downside of closing the corporate shield loophole is that, while it would help with data integrity, it may further damage injured patients' ability to receive compensation: If the corporate shield loophole is the nod-and-wink method insurers are using to pay claims without reporting insured doctors to the NPDB, it follow that closing it will have a negative impact on claims payment.
Another option, which resolves the corporate shield problem and would promote fair compensation, would be to require the reporting of all claims made against an individual doctor, whether paid or not. Under this approach, any claim made against a doctor would require a report, even if not ultimately resulting in a payment. This would both reduce gaming and promote resolution of viable claims. Simply put, doctors would not be able to avoid an NPDB report because the decision to make a claim would be solely in the hands of the patients (as opposed to a settlement, which only occurs with the agreement of the insurer and potentially the individual provider; or a verdict, which requires a jury's approval).
The "all claims" reporting requirement has even received support from some within the medical field as a more honest way to handle reporting. 153 It seems likely, though, that the AMA and others would oppose a rule requiring the reporting of all claims. However, it should be understood that requiring reporting of all claims is not a dramatic departure from current practices. First, many state databanks (or regulatory agencies) already require reporting of all claims, and have carried on this practice without 150 "Whenever a claim of personal injury is made against any practitioner of the healing arts or a licensed hospital, a report shall be made to the appropriate licensing board or agency by the liability insurer of such practitioner or hospital within sixty (60) days after receipt of information that a claim is being made. In the event that such claim is made against a party not insured, the report shall be made by the party." OR. REV. STAT. ANN. Given that doctors already report (or, are at least, are supposed to report) this data to those who would ultimately discover it through an NPDB query, moving to a requirement of reporting "all claims" is not a significant departure from current procedures. It would serve the NPDB's interests by improving data collection, and it would serve the public's interest by removing the barrier to settling of viable claims created by the current NPDB reporting rules.
2. Re-Draft Rules to Close Other Loopholes Section IV of this article describes various loopholes exploited by anti-NPDB people and organizations. The idea that a doctor could pay a malpractice payment out of pocket, or avoiding a written request for money from an attorney, is simply antithetical to the purposes of the NPDB. 155 To improve in this area, HHS should create new regulations that specifically address each "dodge" that has been identified and expressly forbid its practice.
3. Punish Noncompliance with the Law As it stands, avoidance and evasion of reporting for malpractice payments is so rampant that the NPDB cannot be said to have fully accomplished its purported primary report to the board presenting any notice of any civil action filed, settlement of any claim or cause of action, or final judgment rendered in any cause of action for damages for death or personal injury caused by the physician's negligence, error, or omission in practice, or his or her rendering of unauthorized professional services…within thirty (30) days after notice of any civil action filed, settlement, judgment or arbitration." "Any insurer writing coverage for health care malpractice in this state, by March 1 of each year, shall file with the commissioner a report of all claims against a health care provider and a report of all awards or settlements given in cases against health care providers." 155 See supra note 12, Section IV (identifying various dodges use to avoid NPDB reporting) goal of identifying doctors that commit malpractice. 156 This is made possible, in part, by loose reporting requirements, but also potentially by the government's inability to police its own data bank as the law requires. For the entire period of its existence, HHS has never levied a single fine against a noncompliant entity.
157 It stands to reason that a more proactive investigative strategy would help to ferret out evaders, as well as to set a tone reflecting that the government takes enforcement of its own regulations seriously.
Change Attitudes about NPDB Reporting
The NPDB regulations specifically state that "a payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred."
158 It appears, though, that few who are subject to the NPDB actually believe that. A significant problem arises when this attitude is prevalent and serves as a disincentive to settle colorable claims.
A former HHS executive pointed out that "there's nothing in a data bank report that a hospital clinical privileges application doesn't already ask for." 159 Not only do job applications and applications for medical privileges regularly require information about all claims against the provider, but many state boards also require it. 160 Why should that information being kept more centrally be of concern? Still, doctors make no secret of their discomfort with the idea of being "blacklisted" as a result of a report to the NPDB. 161 This intense fear is misplaced. As a group of patient safety advocates recently stated:
It is important to emphasize that the NPDB takes no disciplinary actions; it merely reports on actions and payments that physicians are already required to disclose in their applications. If a physician with a bad record has problems securing a license or clinical privileges, it is because of the underlying malpractice, privileges, or licensing actions, not because of the NPDB. The NPDB is only a messenger-and it is a messenger who provides new information only when a physician fails to make a required disclosure. In practice this has been shown to be both necessary and very valuable to those querying the databank, who, in one study, told university-based surveyors that nine percent of the time NPDB reports provided new decision-affecting information not disclosed as required in physicians' applications. 162 Doctors should simply reject the idea that a report will harm their career trajectory unless clear evidence is presented that careers are harmed by NPDB reporting. Instead, hyperbole and shocking headline have been simply accepted as being true. 163 That fear would replace reliable evidence is unsurprising given the research showing that many subject to it have a very poor understanding of the NPDB. 164 A 1995 study found that 58% of practicing physicians surveyed did not know the general public does not have access to the NPDB information. 165 Only 13% knew how to obtain their files. 166 More than 20% of respondents "thought NPDB was an FBI registry of physicians with felony convictions." 167 Though this information is relatively dated, it should be incumbent upon HHS to determine if awareness of the NPDB has changed within organized medicine and, if not, to work to educate doctors.
An attorney for the American Hospital Association believes doctors should not be so fearful of the NPDB: "Do they check the data bank? Yes… Do they make a decision based solely on the data bank? No. It's just another source of information.'' 168 This message should be repeated, loud and often, by the NPDB, medical associations, hospital administrators, and doctors themselves.
5. Ignore the "Threshold" Red Herring A 2000 editorial in Modern Healthcare described the medical industry's view of the NPDB as follows:
Many…simply hate the idea that malpractice suits and disciplinary actions against them are recorded somewhere, especially in a national repository. They would much rather toss a stick of dynamite at the databank then take out a wrench and fix it. 169 This attitude is emblematic of the approach of threshold proponents. The argument goes that, rather than potentially be asked to explain why a small payment is made on their behalf, doctors should be able to keep those payments secret. In exchange, patients that have suffered modest damages will no longer have their claims held hostage. 170 The stated justification is that some small claims are made "for convenience," though no proponent of thresholds has ever identified why it is justifiable not to report small claims that result from authentic carelessness. 171 Whether employing thresholds would truly have the effect of promoting payment of small claims is unknown. What is certain, though, is that adding a threshold would have negative effects on the databank's integrity. Doing so would further delegitimize it by making it harder to flag doctors who are incompetent. With thresholds, it is impossible to tell if a small claim was made for negligence if unreported and not subject to investigation by potential employers.
Thresholds would lead to a new set of strategies to avoid the new reporting requirements. This can be surmised from the experiences of states that have added thresholds to their databases. For example, New Jersey has a $25,000 floor in its state malpractice database and found that "many doctors were settling claims for $24,999." 172 With this gaming repugnant to the goals of flagging potential negligent doctors, New Jersey repealed its threshold. 173 Ohio has a similar threshold and has found that "payments under $25,000 often represented settlements designed to avoid litigation costs." 174 California, which has a $30,000 reporting floor, had 6.8% of its claims settled for $29,999 and many other claims settled for between $29,000 and $29,990. 175 The experience in these states give no reason for the belief that institution of a reporting threshold would do anything but lead to further distortions in the information reported to the NPDB, the information that Congress believes is necessary to track. The curious figures also, of course, reflect that the thresholds are leading to distorted payments to injured plaintiffs themselves.
In addition to current methods to dodge reporting, new tricks to game the system would also likely arise, should thresholds be included. One option would be to allocate payments among multiple defendants to keep each of their payment amounts under the threshold. 176 If, for example, a surgeon, anesthesiologist, and nurse were all named in a surgical malpractice case and the NPDB began using a $50,000 threshold, each defendant could agree to pay $49,999 (therefore a total of $149,997 to the plaintiff) and avoid being reported. Even among experts, there is no agreement on whether creating a threshold would cause more harm than good. This is true even within HHS. For example, former HHS General Counsel Michael J. Astrue, while serving the agency, favored creating specialtybased thresholds. 177 However, the director of quality assurance at Health Resources and Services Administration (the HHS entity which runs the data bank) said attempting a threshold is an "incredibly complex venture," that would potentially result in unfair line drawing, as well as an administrative nightmare. 
Be Open to Changes that Promote Data Bank Integrity
Methods to further reform the data bank should incorporate evidence-based analysis. Researchers should continue to investigate methods to enhance the integrity of the databank as a flagging tool, while improving patients' ability to recover compensation when entitled by law. Simultaneously, efforts should be made to prevent doctors from being listed if the reporting has no link to proof of their competence to provide future medical care.
To accomplish this goal, the NPDB should be proactive in encouraging researchers to come together to discuss ways to improve the NPDB itself in ways that would benefit the public, individuals harm by malpractice, and medical providers subject to NPDB reporting. However, before such steps should be considered, the NPDB must work to improve the system's integrity so that it can be certain that it captures the appropriate information while incentivizing the settlement of colorable claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
Reforming the NPDB has proven to be an upside-down process: patient rights and public safety have been relegated to the whims of an industry that would rather that the federal government not regulate it. The effect has been that not only is the NPDB's data collection suspect, but patients harmed by malpractice are less likely to receive compensation for their injuries. 177 Id. Astrue's idea was to make the threshold $75,000-$100,000 for neurosurgeons, obstetricians and perhaps other "high-risk" groups; $50,000 for other, physicians; and $20,000-$30,000 for dentists. 178 Id.
